Scholarship 2019
History

9.30 a.m. Thursday 14 November 2019

RESOURCE BOOKLET

Refer to this booklet to answer the questions for Scholarship History.

Check that this booklet has pages 2–30 in the correct order and that none of these pages is blank.

YOU MAY KEEP THIS BOOKLET AT THE END OF THE EXAMINATION.
SOURCE A: POPULISM: A DANGER FOR DEMOCRACY

After Brexit, and with a Trump victory in November still a possibility, liberals are in a panic about populism. They have struggled to comprehend what a figure like Trump is about ideologically … liberals have focused on actual Brexit and Trump supporters, and jumped to conclusions about what they think and, especially, feel. As a result, the content of what, after all, is an “-ism” – that is to say, a political belief system – has become conflated with the supposed psychological states of its supporters, namely feelings of resentment and relative deprivation.

...
It’s tempting to think that all liberals have to do is make these conflicts ones about interests, not identity, and win back voters willing to back populists by offering trade agreements more favourable to workers (and, right now, hammer away at the point that Trump’s actual economic policy proposals, especially the enormous tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy, are a slap in the face of the working class). All this undoubtedly has to be part of an anti-populist strategy. But liberals also have to tread on the dangerous territory of identity politics. They have to argue against the populist fantasies of a “pure people”, and instead fashion attractive and, above all, pluralist conceptions of Britishness and Americanness.

SOURCE B: POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEFINING ‘POPULISM’

The *vox populi*, the voice of the people, usually referred to today as public opinion, is important in both democratic and non-democratic societies. Throughout history, governments, political parties and individual leaders have sought to legitimise themselves and mobilise support through popular appeals that have often been based on the defining of group identity and shared interest that differentiates those appealed to from others. Not all, however, can be labelled ‘populist’.

The New Zealand prime minister who most closely matches the populist model was undoubtedly Robert David Muldoon. He believed that the majority of New Zealanders wanted a strong, competent leader and he sought with considerable success for a long time to cultivate that image. Muldoon was demonstrably and sometimes violently anti-elitist and anti-intellectual and suspicious of the bureaucracy. He distrusted ideology, whether from the extreme left or the extreme right. He saw both unionist officials and bankers as threats to the welfare of the community as a whole, which needed to be protected by the government from their excesses. Socially he stressed conformity and community rather than pluralism or individualism, and he valued stability and security above all else.

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The sources continue on the following page.
In trying to understand populism, political thinkers have long been split about the nature of the phenomenon and how to approach it – is it a type of social movement, ideology or something else? …
This wave of populism – which has continued ever since – has produced a rich explosion of literature on populism, bringing the concept into the domain of mainstream political science, and fuelling debates about how to define the concept. …

SOURCE D: WHAT IS A POPULIST?

No definition of populism will fully describe all populists. That’s because populism is a “thin ideology” in that it “only speaks to a very small part of a political agenda,” according to Cas Mudde, a professor at the University of Georgia and the co-author of *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. An ideology like fascism involves a holistic view of how politics, the economy, and society as a whole should be ordered. Populism doesn’t; it calls for kicking out the political establishment, but it doesn’t specify what should replace it. So it’s usually paired with “thicker” left- or right-wing ideologies like socialism or nationalism.
Stylistically, populists often use short, simple slogans and direct language, and engage in “boorish behaviour, which makes [them] appear like the real people,” said Pippa Norris, a professor at Harvard University who is working on a book on the rise of “populist-authoritarian” politicians around the world, especially in Europe. They are typically “transgressive on all the rules of the game”.

What do World War II, the fall of the Soviet Union, the Syrian civil war, the election of Donald Trump and Brexit have in common? According to demographer Paul Morland, they have all been shaped by an often-overlooked force. Population changes, he says, were at play in these and many other defining events in recent history. “Demography is unquestionably one of the most important factors in driving the world history of the last 200 years,” Dr Morland says.

**World War II**

In the mid-19th century, French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that Russia and the US would be able to overpower Europe through their populations. “Each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destiny of half the globe,” was the conclusion he came to in 1840.

Without these population changes, Dr Morland says, Russia may never have mounted an army big enough to defeat Hitler. “The sheer numbers of men that you could throw into the trenches had a very significant impact on the outcome of war,” he says. “I would say both the cause and the outcome of the war are better understood when we factor in demography. It’s not to say it was all about demography but it’s an important fact.”

He makes the same point about the United States, saying its economic might was to some extent the product of its population size. “If you just look at that chart of population growth between the wars you can trace the emergence of the two superpowers,” Dr Morland says. “[They] would be able to fuel larger economies and larger armies than anything the traditional European powers could field.”

**The fall of the Soviet Union**

Rapid population growth had been a part of the Soviet Union’s emergence as a superpower, but the reverse contributed to its fall only a few decades later. As the Soviet economy spluttered into the 1980s, a drying up in the flow of new Russian workers – a reflection of a slowing birth rate – made its problems very apparent.

“Eventually, the peoples on the outskirts began to modernise, which led to a reversal of this as Russia’s share of the population began to wane.” Russian confidence in its ability to hold the state together was sapped as these non-Russian populations grew. Compounding this was Afghanistan, where the Soviets were embroiled in a complex war effort that could no longer rely on the ever-growing recruits from the Slavic heartlands. “On the outskirts there were more and more young people, and fewer were learning Russia and engaging with a united Soviet culture within the Eastern bloc,” Dr Morland says. “They weren’t sufficiently industrialised to help the economy and because their loyalty for [the] Soviet Union was suspect, it was proving harder and harder to run the army.”
The Syrian civil war

The troubles of the Middle East are not demographic alone, but Dr Morland says the region has been shaken by booming and predominately young populations. Nowhere is this more stark, he says, than in the case of the Syrian civil war, which Dr Morland says “is arguably as much a demographic conflict as it is a political or religious one”.

A stark contrast, he says, is Lebanon, a country that has been under economic pressure in recent decades. Dr Morland says Lebanon and Syria have very similar fissures along ethnic and religious lines, but its median age of 45 has led to different political outcomes, and the country has remained relatively stable in recent decades. “Lebanon has not had a civil war, for all its incredible problems, because people are getting too old for that kind of game, if you like,” Dr Morland says.

From Trump to Brexit

After a post-war baby boom, birth rates in many places in the past half century have slowed, and societies have grown older. In order to keep economies ticking, many Western countries have taken in migrants from developing countries — leading to rapid demographic change.

Dr Morland says in the US, the still-dominant white vote has, to some extent, reflected a backlash against rapid ethno-demographic change. “If you look at the data and you analyse who voted for Trump, demographic change in our societies seems to be the biggest factor,” he says.

“Whatever the future holds, of one thing we can be sure — demography and destiny will continue to be intertwined.”

The common objective of populist politicians in both Europe and the United States is to “take back our country.” They argue that traditional understandings of national identity are being diluted and overtaken by newcomers with different values and cultures and by a progressive left that attacks the very idea of national identity as racist and intolerant.

Nationalists such as … Adolf Hitler grounded their definitions of nation in biology and argued that the existing nations of the world constituted racial entities that had existed from time immemorial. Others made an allegedly unchanging inherited culture the basis for nationhood. Such theories became the justification for the aggressive nationalisms of early twentieth-century Europe, whose exponents were defeated with the fall of Nazism in 1945.

The history of the common people as a special field of study begins with the history of mass movements in the eighteenth century. I suppose Michelet is the first great practitioner of grassroots history: the Great French Revolution is at the core of his writing. And ever since, the history of the French Revolution, especially since Jacobinism was revitalised by socialism and the Enlightenment by Marxism, has been the proving-ground of this kind of history. If there is a single historian who anticipates most of the themes of contemporary work, it is Georges Lefebvre, whose Great Fear, translated into English after forty years, is still remarkably up to date. To put it more generally: it was the French tradition of historiography as a whole, steeped in the history not of the French ruling class but of the French people, which established most of the themes and even the methods of grassroots history, Marc Bloch as well as Georges Lefebvre. But the field really began to flourish in other countries only after the Second World War. In fact its real advance only began in the middle 1950s, when it became possible for Marxism to make its full contribution to it.

And as in the past one of our tasks is to uncover the lives and thoughts of common people and to rescue them from Edward Thompson’s “enormous condescension of posterity”, so our problem at present is also to strip away the equally presumptuous assumptions of those who think they know both what the facts and what the solutions are, and who seek to impose them on the people. We must discover what people really want of a good or even a tolerable society, and, what is no means the same – because they may not actually know – what they need from such a society.

“The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip,” Ronald Reagan said in 1989. He was speaking to a thousand British notables in London’s historic Guildhall, several months before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Reagan proclaimed that the world was on the precipice of a “new era in human history,” one that would bring “peace and freedom for all.” Communism was crumbling, just as fascism had before it. Liberal democracies would soon encircle the globe, thanks to the innovations of Silicon Valley. “I believe,” he said, “that more than armies, more than diplomacy, more than the best intentions of democratic nations, the communications revolution will be the greatest force for the advancement of human freedom the world has ever seen.”

If we’re going to resist the rise of despotism, we need to understand how this happened and why we didn’t see it coming. We especially need to grapple with the fact that today’s right wing has taken advantage of a decades-long liberal effort to decentralise our media. That effort began at the start of the Second World War, came down to us through the counterculture of the 1960s, and flourishes today in the high-tech hothouse of Silicon Valley. It is animated by a deep faith that when engineering replaces politics, the alienation of mass society and the threat of totalitarianism will melt away. As Trump fumes on Twitter, and Facebook posts are linked to genocide in Myanmar, we are beginning to see just how misplaced that faith has been. Even as they grant us the power to communicate with others around the globe, our social-media networks have spawned a new form of authoritarianism.

Almost immediately after the Arab uprisings began, there was debate over the role and influence of social media in the ouster of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the imminent overthrow of Mubarak. Civil society leaders in Arab countries emphasised the role of “the internet, mobile phones, and social media” in the protests. Additionally, digital media has been used by Arabs to exercise freedom of speech and as a space for civic engagement.

Former Premier Sir John Hall unwinds, in the manner of a carpet roll, a 25 000-signature petition presented to Parliament in 1893 supporting women’s suffrage. He asks his political colleagues whether they liked ‘the pattern’. Enough of them did to pass legislation giving the women the vote in time for that year’s general election.

Petitions could help end the slave trade – but not the institution of slavery.

Source: https://atlantablackstar.com/2014/02/18/6-common-misconceptions-enslavement-african-people/5/
Within 15 years of their arrival, Chinese became the victims of racist hostility. By 1905 when John Collis Blomfield’s cartoon appeared in the *New Zealand Free Lance*, a poll tax on every incoming Chinese person had been imposed and then raised from £10 to £100. But this did not stop the concern, and – as the cartoon suggests – there were highly negative stereotypes of Chinese. People also called for even higher poll taxes to keep Chinese immigrants out.

SOURCE I2: ANTI-CHINESE PROTESTS IN TIMARU

It did not take many Chinese to alarm a community. In Timaru a third fruit shop was enough. It was set up early in 1920 close to a shop owned by a returned soldier who at once withered under the cold wind of its competition. The three Chinese shops seem to have been under the same ownership. Certainly they were all managed by Mr W. Ching, who claimed an American university degree. He said also that he had two brothers who had served in the war and he himself had been rejected as unfit. The local RSA was early alarmed, and also bitter that “some who were most free in waving flags and in patriotic shouting are now his best patrons”. Members of the association tried to organise a boycott of the Chinese shops and suggested that the ladies of Timaru form a committee to picket them. The names of those who still persisted in buying their household cabbages cheaply should be published under the heading “We fought not for the Chinese but for a white New Zealand”.

A few weeks on and the ‘yellow tide’ had reached Dunedin. One fruit shop had been opened and the octopus was “feeling for about a dozen other businesses”. One City Councillor thought that this particular octopus, though it might have yellow tentacles, had a Jewish brain directing its operations. Another saw the whole question in terms of a wicked southward probe by capital based in Wellington or Auckland. There was, however, general agreement on the Council that “the race should be kept as pure as possible”.

SOURCE J: THE RĀTANA MOVEMENT

The most important new ‘disengager’ initiative of the twentieth century was the Rātana movement, a religious and political organisation founded by Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana after a divine revelation in 1918. Rātana, known to his followers as the Māngai, or Mouthpiece, initially came to prominence through his practice of faith-healing, but it quickly became clear that his movement was the latest and largest of the long series of indigenously developed Māori-Christian religions. Early support was strong in Auckland, Northland, Wairarapa and Hawke’s Bay, as well as Rātana’s home territory of Taranaki and Whanganui. By 1936, support was spread nationwide and the official figure was 20 per cent. Census figures understate the movement’s actual influence, and one estimate goes as high as 40,000, or half the Māori population in the mid-1930s.

The antagonism of some Māori, many Pākehā, and the established churches, coupled with its own policy “not to publicise its teachings” except orally, has left the Rātana movement with less historical attention than it deserves. The direct role of the movement in Māori health and education, for example, is hard to discover but may have been substantial. The Māngai encouraged schooling and attention to hygiene and sanitation, and emphasised that he never opposed Pākehā medicine. Equally intriguing and mysterious is the degree of Rātana’s social radicalism. Rātana emphasised Māori unity, as did both the Kingitanga and the Young Māori. But the other two organisations were pan-tribal; their ‘Māori people’ was constructed from tribal building blocks. Rātana’s movement was more non-tribal, like that of Te Ua Haumēne before him, and there are signs of similar rejections of hereditary chieftainship and some other traditions.

Struggles for land resurfaced in the 1960s as National governments befuddled by the political effects of urbanisation persisted with the settler concern that tribal land was not effectively used and that this hindered economic development. Rather the assumption was that now Māori were urbanised, tribes no longer needed their ancestral land, which had lost its central cultural importance. On the contrary, as university students asserted in 1966, Māori lands were for Māori use; misguided moves by the government to ‘Europeanise’ tribal land as part of the drive to integrate Māori incited protests rather than promoting racial harmony as intended.

As a result, Ngā Tamatoa, radicals and kaumātua together, took to the road on the Māori Land March in 1975 to alert Pākehā and the government to the issues, and to fight the ‘last land grab’ represented by the 1967 Act, as well as others passed soon after concerning rates, public works and local government schemes, all of which allowed the taking of tribal land. The protestors’ slogan echoed the Kingitanga call: “not one more acre of Māori land”. Led by 80-year-old Whina Cooper, the foundation president of the Māori Women’s Welfare League, the protestors walked from the far north to Wellington. On the last day they marched to parliament powerfully and silently in the rain, to deliver their message not merely about grievances over the loss of ancestral land – which had grown more, not less, important to urban people – but that the government should finally acknowledge property rights under the Treaty of Waitangi.

Fascism is not an exception to humanity, but part of it. Even people who enlisted in such movements out of ambition, greed, or hatred likely either were unaware of, or denied to themselves, their true motives.

In *Cabaret*, there is an electrifying moment at a beer garden when a young Nazi rises to his feet and, joined by most but not all of those present, belts out an anthem of promise and horror:

*The branch of the linden is leafy and green*

*Tomorrow belongs to me.*

Fascism caught on because many people in Europe and elsewhere saw it as a mighty wave that was transforming history, that was owned by them alone, and that couldn’t be stopped.

A few leaders of the working people of industrial Britain believed in self-improvement through education, temperance and religion, and for a while flirted with the possibility of some sort of broad middle- and working-class alliance. But it was precisely the ‘traditionalism’ of the grievances that made them seem, in the eyes of activists who came together in torchlight meetings and processions in 1838 and the millions who signed the monster Chartist petitions in 1839, 1842 and 1848, their indisputably legitimate birthright as free-born Britons.

Inevitably the petitions ... met with a ... derisory, response.

... At Newport on 3 November [1839] a battle took place between the Chartists and the authorities, resulting in at least 15 dead and at least 50 seriously wounded. It was the largest loss of life inflicted by a British government on its own people at any time in the 19th or 20th century.

SOURCE M2: A WARNING TO CHARTISTS

Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/nationalarchives/3507414988
The protest movements from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the last Chartist agitation of 1848 represent the slow emergence of working-class agitation and organisations in town, then country. Often working men and women were enlisted by liberal middle-class reformers to help push for the political reform of the old aristocratic-controlled constitution, culminating in the passing of the Great Reform Bill of 1832.

Working-class protest then entered a more modern phase climaxing in the demand for working-class political rights, a struggle lost in Britain in the 1840s but speedily won in the Australian colonies. The Chartists were the last English political protestors to be transported.

In the struggle for a new constitution in New South Wales … liberal reformers seeking a democratically elected lower house drew on the traditional rhetoric of free-born Englishmen but took the details of their program from the radical Chartists.

* riven split or torn apart

SOURCE N1: THE MARSEILLAISE

Arise, children of the Fatherland,
The day of glory has arrived!
Against us, tyranny’s
Bloody standard is raised, (repeat)
Do you hear, in the countryside,
The roar of those ferocious soldiers?
They’re coming right into your arms
To cut the throats of your sons, your women!

Sacred love of the Fatherland,
Lead, support our avenging arms
Liberty, cherished Liberty,
Fight with thy defenders! (repeat)
Under our flags may victory
Hurry to thy manly accents,
So that thy expiring enemies
See thy triumph and our glory!
To arms, citizens …

On March 18 1871, Parisians living on Montmartre awakened to the sounds of French troops attempting to seize the cannons of the National Guard. The troops were under the orders of Adolphe Thiers, the conservative head of a provisional government recently ensconced in Versailles, once the residence of the Bourbon monarchs of the Ancien Régime. Thiers, fearing the mobilisation of angry and radicalised Parisians, wanted to disarm their city and its National Guard. The ranks of the Guard were filled for the most part by workers who wanted a strong republic and were angered by the capitulation of the provisional government in the disastrous war against Prussia that had begun the previous July and brought about the fall of the Second Empire.

The birth and destruction of the Paris Commune, one of the most tragic, defining events of the nineteenth century, still resonates today. In the streets of Paris, Thiers's army gunned down thousands of ordinary men, women and, occasionally, children. Soldiers executed many for their participation in the defence of the Commune; others died because their workers' attire, remnants of a Parisian National Guard uniform, or simply their occupation or manner of speaking marked them for death. The massacres carried out by French troops against their own countrymen anticipated the demons of the century to follow. You could be gunned down simply because of who you were, because you wanted to be free. This may have been the ultimate significance of Bloody Week, 21–28 May 1871, the biggest massacre in Europe of the nineteenth century.

The political scene of 2011 was dominated by the figure and phenomenology* of the encampment or occupation, and it was the return of an occupational form of protest that compelled me, in turn, to go back to the political culture of the Paris Commune with a different set of questions than those which animated the historical poetics of the Commune I wrote [about] in the 1980s.

It seems utterly reasonable to me that younger people today, put off by a career trajectory in video-game design, hedge-fund management, or smartphone bureaucracy, trying to carve out spaces and ways to live on the edges of various informal economies, might well find interesting the debates that took place among members of the Communard, debates that is about decentralised communities, how they might come into being and flourish, and the way they might become “federated” with each other in relations of solidarity.

* phenomenology the study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience

SOURCE N4: OCCUPY WALL STREET

Source: https://www.vanityfair.com/news/photos/2012/01/occupy-wall-street-slideshow-201201#7